Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition Edward Luttwak shows—they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire. “If you want peace, prepare for war.” “A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive.” “The worst road may be the best route to battle.” Strategy is made. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace rev. and enlarged ed. by Edward N. Luttwak Cambridge, MA: The Belknap. Press of Harvard University Press,

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On p67, Luttwak overlaps with Schelling’s Arms and Influence, noting that nuclear weapons have removed optimism from war, so that balance doesn’t have to be experienced to be accepted, at least in terms of nuclear capabilities.

This book is highly recommended. The greatest virtue of war is that, in destruction, it consumes the ability to continue it indefinitely He highlights the necessity of trying to anticipate how your neighbors and opponents will react to new luttawk, tactics, operations, etc.

Navy United vehicles victory vulnerable warfare. Preview — Strategy by Edward N. I loved Liddell Hart. Edward Nicolae Luttwak is a military strategist, political scientist, and historian who has published works on military strategy, history, and international relations.

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

A variety of lessons learned are clearly presented and illustrated with historical examples in an understandable manner. Negotiating ends to war might be worse than fighting to the bitter conclusion. His discussions on blitzkrieg, defensive depth, culmination points strategj guided vs unguided weaponry alone are worth the the price of admission. Luttwak’s reasoning is enlightening and worth listening to.

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace – Edward N. Luttwak – Google Books

Interesting book covering Grand strategy: Not as good as his first magnum opus, Coup d’etat. Harvard University Press Amazon. Sep 04, Jennifer Taw rated it really liked it. Thought Provoking 3 6. References to this book International Relations Then and Now: Such insights wash away the illusion of peaceful coexistence over the longue duree.

To be sure, Luttwak thought about and engaged in the nuclear debates of the day. Yet the greater production possibilities for a given weapon leads to greater exposure for enemies who ultimately adapt, thereby undermining its effectiveness.


I’m glad I read it, but I think I would only recommend it to those who either have a working interest in the field or those ,uttwak a lot of time on their hands. It is possible to lose because of the costs of a successful defense. Sep 17, Jefferson rated it it was amazing Shelves: I read the opening chapter during my university studies in the past, and I am happy that now I am out of school, I had the chance to finish the book and comprehend Luttwak’s argument in its entirety.

It’s like borders, like the distinctions of languages, wqr always exists. It is written in simple English, presented clearly enough for even this Arts graduate to understand. In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics.

Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world’s foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.

The book is the equivalent of a full course in the subject of Strategy and should be of interest to both the military historian as well as anyone who has to realistically deal managing scarce time and resources One of the best non-fiction books I’ve tthe read in a long long time!

Aug 06, Phoenix rated it it was amazing Shelves: Victory is shown to contain the seeds of defeat and vice versa. Had France relied on a less successful technique, such as trenches, Germany might have chosen a frontal attack, which France would have been able to intermit.

Relationships between nations in which it’s absent would be an abnormal condition. And when a state is more concerned with keeping its soldiers alive than with winning a war, Luttwak writes, military victories are hard to accomplish.

France’s determination to construct a fortification line to decrease the number of casualties in a potential war with Germany was more than understandable, yet it persuaded German forces to invade France from Belgium. It can appear between different levels of war, when the right tactical decision may result in the worst operational outcome, as seen in the case of French soldiers who abandoned their positions in May to stop a limited German offensive, only to be taken aback by a full force attack.


In one telling example, Luttwak shows the paradoxes of economies of scale applied to military technology. He then offers advice on five distinct levels of strategy: It is by far one of the best general introductions to the different levels of warfare: Luttwak’s conviction was later confirmed by several quantitative studies, including Monica Duffy Toft’s article Ending Civil Wars: One of the paradoxes of war, he tells us, is that it creates luttwk by destroying peacw means necessary to engage in combat.

I am no fan of war, but I am convinced that its study and comprehension is crucial if future anv are to be avoided, or at least curtailed or foreshortened. It’s Luttwak’s idea that strategy is being constantly practiced.

This example of paradox is simply the first of many from a world history rich with conflict. Technological efficiency can be easily measured, helping decision makers pursue the most economical and effective weapons the ratio of input to output.

The author considers the use of the availability of force as a tool of persuasion, where it is effective, and where it is not. He also criticizes relatively well paid and well supported NATO troops as being hampered by being both overly cautious and bureaucratic. These case studies and historical examples lend themselves to a quasi-social scientific framework reminiscent of Neustadt and May. I believe I learned more from reading these pages than any book I’ve read recently.

Edward Luttwak has an incredibly ability to rock the strategic Casbah.

Account Options Sign in. Luttwak takes the examination of strategy to a level not seen since Clausewitz, and much more readable.