FIELD MANUAL No. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Section V – AirLand Battle and Counterguerrilla Operations. Donor challenge: Your generous donation will be matched 2-to-1 right now. Your $5 becomes $15! Dear Internet Archive Supporter,. I ask only. Counterguerilla Operations FM MCRP a [Department of Defense, Taylor Anderson] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The

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Preventive defensive techniques include movement security, security patrolling, and combat patrolling, among others. The material in this chapter is general and refers only to countering guerrilla activities in the rear areas of friendly forces engaged in conventional conflicts Figure For whatever the reasons — social, political, or economic — the population is generally open to change.

The doctrine provides principles to guide the actions of US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations. The climate is also analyzed to determine the effect it will have on guerrilla operations as regards trafficability, visibility, and equipment.

Generally, a mild climate favors the guerrilla force since it induces less physical hardship, and may provide year-round vegetation for subsistence, cover, and concealment. That situation may occur when US forces operate in captured enemy territory. The counterguerrilla force commander must be aware that the guerrilla force may have NBC weapons available to it. Inhumane treatment and criminal acts murder, rape, or theft, even under stress of combat and with provocation are serious and punishable violations under international law, the law of land warfare, and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

For a more recent view of related doctrine, see the U. An insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government. Lack of government control. Since a major goal of participants in a conventional conflict is to gain control of territory through the use of regular armed forces, the forms of guerrilla activity change.


Once it completes the tactical mission and notifies the rear area operations center, it will be released to its parent unit. To be successful in countering this type of war, the planners of counterguerrilla operations must understand the enemy and the unique environment in which he operates.

In the event that the conflict takes place in enemy territory that is occupied, then the policies concerning interaction the the civilian populace will be formulated at theater level in consonance with guidance from the US government. The tactics used by both conventional and unconventional guerrilla forces remain the same. Guerrilla operations in this case support the main effort of the enemy force by disrupting command, control, communications, and logistical operations of friendly forces.

Lack of government control may be real or perceived. The counterguerrilla force identifies likely targets and takes measures to protect them. However, if it does exist, it normally occurs in support of enemy forces engaged in conventional combat with friendly forces and occurs in the friendly force rear areas. The commander uses one third of the available time for planning and leaves two thirds for subordinate planning and preparation.

Usually, when US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate previously captured friendly territory, the sociological factors generally favor the counterguerrilla force.

FM Chptr 4 Counterguerrilla Operations In Conventional Conflicts

If a tactical combat force is assigned to the rear battle, it will be placed under the operational control OPCON of the rear battle officer. The guerrilla force may possess weapons, communications, and technology equal to or superior to the rear battle forces.

Many of the methods of resistance are part of the stock-in-trade of revolutionary activity. In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla operation is unique. When US forces operate in captured enemy territory, then the sociological factors may favor the guerrilla force.


The ability of the guerrilla force to operate successfully does not rely on the attainment of popular support.

Operahions, the counterguerrilla force plans its operations to minimize damage to the economic structure of an area. It must be anticipated that nuclear, chemical, and biological, as well as conventional weapons and tactics may be utilized to achieve guerrilla goals.

FM Table of Contents

The counterguerrilla force, on the other hand, is usually not oprrations on the economy for its logistics. This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counter- guerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments.

Special units trained for guerrilla warfare usually have a primary mission to counterguerilla guerrilla warfare operations against targets of opportunity with a follow-on mission to train an indigenous guerrilla force.

Conventional conflicts imply a state of open belligerency between nations and a direct confrontation of their armed forces.

In addition, the counterguerrilla force maximizes all information that can be gained from tactical operations to locate the guerrilla force. Unconventional warface forces that may conduct guerrilla warfare consist of special units trained specifically for guerrilla warfare and indigenous guerrilla forces sponsored by the 908- enemy force. Generally, these techniques can be classified as either offensive or defensive.

This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counteryuerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. In this situation, the guerrilla force may be receiving some support from the populace. A guerrilla threat may not exist in these situations. Effective use of populace and resources control operations and psychological operations can reduce the logistical support received through the populace.